Native Americans\u27 Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause? by Rosenberg, Erica R
Boston College Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 5
3-1-1985
Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites:
Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause?
Erica R. Rosenberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erica R. Rosenberg, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise
Clause?, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 463 (1985), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol26/iss2/5
NATIVE AMERICANS' ACCESS TO RELIGIOUS
SITES: UNDERPROTECTED UNDER THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE?
The Supreme Court has interpreted the free exercise clause of the first amendment'
as the guarantor of the widest possible exercise of religious practices consistent with
ordered liberty. 2
 The purpose of the free exercise clause is to guarantee a degree of
freedom of action in religious affairs. 3 Its scope, however, is curtailed by the breadth of
government regulation and action.' In addition, the scope of its protection is contingent
upon interpretations of the term "religion." To analyze claims brought under the free
exercise clause, the Supreme Court formulated a balancing test„ enunciated in Wisconsin v.
Yoder' and Sherbert v. Verner.' The test for evaluating challenges to government actions
under the free exercise clause requires a court first to determine whether a burden on
religion has been established and second, once a burden has been established, to weigh
the government interest served by the challenged action against the degree of impairment
to the religious practice.' Only if the governmental interest is so compelling that it
outweighs the relatively slight impairment to the religious practice will the challenged
action be upheld."
Recently, Native Americans have brought a number of claims challenging the gov-
ernment's use of public lands as violations of the first amendment's free exercise clause.'
At issue in these cases is the extent to which the first amendment protects Native
Americans from government management of public lands when such management inter-
feres with Native American religious practice.° In the majority of these cases, the courts
U.S. CONS•, amend. 1, provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."
2 See generally United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1943).
• See generally Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, SO HARV. L.
REV. 1381, 1388 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gianella].
• Id. at 1382-83.
5 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
• 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
T See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
8 Id.
• See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd, 620
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641
(D. Utah 1977), aft 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 413 (1983); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D.
Alaska 1982), affd,  746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R.
3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd sub nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nom. Wilson v. Block, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983), Navajo Medicine men's Association v. Block, 104 S. Ct.
739 (1983); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983). See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at 21 for a discussion of a suit underway brought by
the Jemez tribe and an association of New Mexico pueblo tribes, among others, against the United
States Forest Service.
'° This note is confined to a discussion of the free exercise clause. The establishment clause,
however, is also implicated in several of the cited cases. See U.S. CONS? amend. 1. For a regulation or
action to overcome an establishment clause challenge, it must meet three criteria. First, the purpose
of the statute must reflect a legitimate secular interest. Second, the effect of the statute must neither
advance nor inhibit religion in general, Third, the statute must not result in excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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have upheld the constitutionality of congressional or administrative decisions to alter
lands holy to Native Americans." The Native Americans have unsuccessfully challenged
the completion of a dam, 12 the exploration of waters,' 3
 the flooding of a natural bridge, '4
the construction of roads and parking lots,'' and the placement of a ski resort ' 6
 on lands
sacred to them. Courts have held that all of these government actions were constitution-
ally permissible. In one case, howeVer, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California found that the first amendment precluded the government's pro-
posed activity and protected the Native Americans' access to religious sites.' In Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson, the court held that the completion of a
logging road through Native Americans' sacred lands was impermissible under the free
exercise clause of the first amendment."' In light of the Supreme Court's treatment and
interpretation of the first. amendment, as well as the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act (AIRFA),'" the outcome and analysis of the Peterson case alone was proper.
With the exception of Peterson, all the Native American challenges to governmental
use of land failed. The majority of these holdings are inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's treatment of religion. In all but one of the cases in which the Native Americans'
claims failed, the balancing test enunciated in Sherbert and Yoder was improperly applied."
In two cases, the courts failed to find a religious interest that warranted applying the
balancing test."' These cases indicate the court's difficulty in defining "religion." In two
other cases, the courts found religious interests that potentially warranted protection, but
The relief sought is highly relevant to an establishment clause analysis. See, e.g., Inupiat Com-
munity of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982) (relief sought by the
tribe creates establishment clause problems because "a free exercise claim cannot be pushed to the
point of awarding exclusive rights to a public area"). But el Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (where government action violates the free exercise clause, the establishment clause
should not bar judicial relief),
.	 " See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (F.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641
(D. Utah 1977), aff 'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 413 (1983); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D.
Alaska 1982), gird, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R.
3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff 'd sub nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nom. Wilson v. Block 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983), Navajo Medicinemen's Association v. Block, 104 S. Ct.
739 (1983).
" Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980).
Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982).
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
'5
 Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1983).
'6
 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
17
 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 591 (N.D.
Cal. 1982).
10 Id. at 591.
n 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982) [hereinafter cited as AIRE/kJ reads:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of' the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including burnot limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
2° See infra notes 150-441 and accompanying text.
21
 Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 520 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980); Inupiat
Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982).
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held that the government action involved did not burden that interest. 22 In one case, the
court erred when it evaluated the government interest alone to determine that no burden
on religion was created rather than evaluating both the government and religious inter-
ests. 23 In the other, the facts and analysis supported a finding that no burden was imposed
on religion rendering the outcome proper.' Finally, in another case, the court neglected
to analyze the nature of the religious interest."-5 Misapplying the balancing test, the court
concluded that the government interest overrode any religious interest. 26 The court in
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson alone properly applied - all parts of
the Yoder and Sherbert balancing test and found the Native Americans' claims to be valid."'
This note will focus on the line of cases involving free exercise claims of Native
Americans and the governmental use of public property. The note first will discuss the
free exercise clause and the balancing test developed by the Supreme Court to analyze
claims under the clause. Following that discussion, the note will examine how this balanc-
ing test has been applied in the context of Native American challenges to governmental
use of public property. IL will argue that potentially valid claims have failed because courts
have applied the test improperly. Further, the note will assert that the Native Americans'
claims in Peterson succeeded because that court properly applied the test. Although factual
differences among the cases may have affected their outcomes, the courts' interpretations
of what constitutes a religious practice and an infringement on a practice have been the
critical factors in determining whether the Native Americans or the government pre-
vailed. This note will conclude that the majority of these courts have misconstrued
Sherbert ,Yoder , and other cases interpreting the first amendment. In addition, the note will
suggest that courts have not given sufficient weight to the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (AIRFA) in deciding these cases. AIRFA may he useful in clarifying the
meaning of the term "religion" and in helping define the limits of government action
regarding the religious practices of Native Americans. The note will suggest that the
reasoning of the Peterson court is promising in its sensitivity to Native Americans' religious
interests and in its accuracy in interpreting and applying the free exercise balancing test.
Finally, this note will assert that Native Americans' claims continue to face stumbling
blocks in the form of the heavy weight accorded to the government's interest in land
management and establishment clause concerns that can frustrate fashioning remedies to
accommodate Native American religions.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONTEXT
A. The Free Exercise Clause
The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion. 2" In protecting the practice of religion, the free exercise clause
prohibits the proscription of any religious belief. 25 Moreover, the clause requires the
22 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Grow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
" Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744.
" Crow, 706 F.2d at 858.
" Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
26 Id.
" Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 591.
" See supra note 1. The free exercise clause is applicable to the states as well. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
29 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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government to accommodate the practice of religious beliefs when the government
incidentally burdens religious practices.' Like any first amendment right, however, the
right to free exercise of religion is not absolute:" Courts have distinguished the freedom
of belief from the freedom of practice to allow burdens on the latter."' Burdens on the
practice of religion are permissible only when they are incident to regulation of secular
activities and the state interest is so great that it overrides claims for a religious exemption
or accommodatio n. 33
I n addition to forbidding the prohibition of a religion and requiring accommodation
of religious interests that outweigh state interests, the free exercise clause forbids the
government from conferring benefits or imposing burdens on individuals because of
their religious beliefs."' Government action may burden religion when it inhibits or
prohibits activity important to the practice of a particular religion:" A burden may be
"direct," prohibiting essential religious activities," or "indirect," inhibiting the practice of
a religion." Both direct and indirect burdens are reviewed under the same standard 38 — a
balancing test weighing the infringement on religion against the state's interest in the
regulation or activity. 39
Although courts have formulated a test for establishing when a law or action burdens
the practice of religion, they have not enunciated explicit guidelines for meeting the test's
requirements." Generally, the courts have concluded that to establish a burden on
religion, a plaintiff must show that the burden on religion is substantial and coercive,
forcing -him to forego the practice of his religion.' Any regulation substantially impeding
the practice of religion is, therefore, sufficiently "coercive" to warrant review under the
balancing test. 42
 After determining the degree of burden on the religious practice, the
courts assess the state interest by evaluating the importance of the interest and the extent
to which an exemption for the religious practice would impair that interest. 43 A truly
compelling state interest requires no exemption." In cases involving a lesser state interest,
" See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 - 15.
31 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
" See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (the prohibition of polygamy
was upheld).
" See Thomas v. Review Board, Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981).
34
 See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (requirement that a person take an oath
attesting to belief in God as prerequisite to public employment was unconstitutional).
" See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
tb See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (the prohibition of polygamy has a
direct effect on the Mormons' religious practices).
37
 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws have indirect effect of
economic costs to those whose Sabbath is not on Sunday).
3" Compare Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), with Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. Sherbert required that the state interest must
be compelling, 374 U.S. at 406. Yoder merely required that the state interest be more important than
the religious interest. But see Thomas v. Review Bd., lnd. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
718-19 (1981) (reiterating Sherbert's standard).
" See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
4 ' See Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). See also School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963).
42 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
" Id.
" Id. Examples of compelling state interests include the state's interest in a day of rest, Braun-
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courts require the state to accommodate the religious interest by examining less restrictive
means for effecting the states' goals."
The balancing test for evaluating free exercise claims was enunciated by the Supreme
Court in two cases, Sherbert v. Verner" and Wisconsin v. Yoder.'' In Sherbert, the Supreme
Court held that a Seventh Day Adventist could not be denied state unemployment
benefits because she refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.'" The plaintiff' in Sherbert
was discharged from her employment for refusing to work on Saturday." Subsequently,
she was unable to obtain other employment and the state denied her unemployment
benefits." The state argued that she had failed to accept suitable work without good
cause." The State Employment Security Commission's action was sustained by the South
Carolina Supreme Court." Employing a two-part balancing test, the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed the state court's decision, asserting that the denial of benefits
"must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement
by the state of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden
on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest
in the regulation' . ."53
The Court in Sherbert set forth requirements for establishing the existence of an
impermissible burden in violation of the first amendment. 54 First, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that the regulation imposes a burden on the exercise of her religion." Second, once a
burden is established, the state's interest must outweigh the degree of infringement on
free exercise rights." The importance of the state interest and the possibility of using
alternative means that do not burden religion to accomplish the same end are factors in
such a review." Employing this analysis the Court ruled that the denial of benefits in
Sherbert was impermissible under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.'"
According to the Court, the plaintiff had proved that the state regulation impermissibly
burdened her exercise of' religion" because it forced her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting employment benefits, or abandoning the precepts
of her religion to accept work." The Court ruled that such proof of a burden on the
felt' v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws); the health and safety of minors,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (upholding a child labor law applied to children
distributing religious materials); and the preservation of morality, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) (upholding laws prohibiting polygamy).
as Examples of state interests requiring accommodation of religious interests include protecting
an unemployment fund from fraudulent claims, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
education, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
as
so Id.
Si Id. at 399-401.
" Id. See 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
" Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415. 438 (1963)).




56 Id. at 406.
" Id. at 406-07.
" Id. at 409.
" Id. at 403.
6° Id. at 404.
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exercise of religion required the state to prove a compelling or overriding interest in the
regulation.' The state's contention that the regulation deterred fraudulent claims was
insufficient, according to the Court, to establish a compelling or overriding interest."
The Supreme Court reiterated and elaborated the balancing test set forth in Sherbert
in Wisconsin v. Yoder." In Yoder, a group of Amish were convicted of violating a state
compulsory education requirement." They challenged the conviction on first amendment
grounds. 65 The Amish believed that integration into the religious community must be
effected through vocational training at the home and on the farm."' The root of this belief
is the idea that salvation requires life in a church community apart from the world and
worldly affairs. 67 They argued therefore that compulsory education abridged their free
exercise rights by removing children from the home. 68 The Court ruled in favor of the
Amish and allowed them a religious exemption to the mandatory education require-
ments. 69
In analyzing the validity of the Amish groups' claims, the Court first evaluated the
sincerity of their religious beliefs." Convinced of such sincerity,'" the Court stated that
claims must be "rooted in religious belief" to invoke the protection of the first amend-
ment." The Court asserted that the first amendment does not afford protection to
nonreligious — ethical or cultural — challenges to state regulations," but did not specify
the criteria for determining whether a belief is "rooted in religion." It did, however, note
that factors to be considered in this determination include whether the practice is held by
an organized group, related to lifestyle, and grounded in Biblical interpretation." The
Court noted that the Amish lifestyle was a direct response to their interpretation of the
Biblical command of "he not conformed to this world."" Furthermore, it noted that
religion pervades their entire way of life." The Court then concluded that the Amish
practice was rooted in religion."
In addition to requiring that plaintiffs establish that the belief is rooted in religion,
the Yoder Court required the plaintiffs to establish that the challenged government action
burdened their religious practice in order to prove a first amendment violation." The
Amish effectively established that the compulsory education requirement imposed a
"I Id. at 403.
" Id. at 407. Furthermore, by noting that the plaintiff was a potentially productive member of
society despite her religious beliefs, the Court suggested that the state is not required to accommo-
date every religious practice if such accommodation means abandoning the ends of its program. Id.
at 410.
63 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
64 Id. at 205.
" Id. at 207-09.
66 Id.
" Id. at 212.
" Id.
69 Id. at 234-35.
76 Id. at 216-18.
" Moreover, the state had stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere. Id. at 210.
72 Id. at 215.
" Id. at 216.
74 Id. at 217.
" Id.
76 Id.
" Id. at 219.
" Id. at 214.
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burden on their religious practice because it forced them either to act contrary to their
religious tenets or to risk criminal sanctions." More importantly, the Court noted that
compulsory school attendance infringed on first amendment rights of the Amish by
threatening to undermine the Amish community and religious practice."
Under the test enunciated in Yoder, once the plaintiff has established a burden on his
exercise of religion," the government has the burden of proving that an "interest of
sufficient magnitude td override the interests claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause" exists or that its requirement does not deny the free exercise of religion."' In
employing the balancing test, the Court asserted that "only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served" can outweigh free exercise claims." The Court
concluded that despite a strong interest in education, the state's interest did not outweigh
the religious interest of the Amish." Furthermore, the Court found that the goals of the
state would not be impaired by the religious exemption."'
The Court reaffirmed its reasoning and the prohibition of indirect religious infring-
ement in Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Division" In Thomas, Indiana
denied unemployment benefits to a factory worker who had resigned for religious
reasons." Relying on Sherbert and Yoder, the Court held that the state's interest in
protecting its unemployment program was insufficient to justify the burden on plaintiff's
religious liberty." The case affirmed Sherbert's assertion that the first amendment some-
times requires that the government refrain from acting unless it actively protects a
religious interest.
Sherbert and Yoder established a test for evaluating free exercise claims." First, to
qualify for first amendment protection, religious beliefs must be held in good faith. 9°
Second, the practice must be rooted in religious belief and must further this belief."
Finally, the plaintiff must establish the import or centrality of the practice to his religion. 92
Once such a burden is met, the focus of the court's examination shifts to the government
" Id. at 218-19.
8° Id.
81 Id. at 215.
92 Id.
83 Id.
" Id. at 230-34.
" Id. at 236.
84
 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
" Id. at 709.
" Id. at 718-19.
" For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the tests, see Note, Religious
Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 VALE L.J. 350 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note,Religious Exemptions]. These differences are not significant for purposes of
this note. Sherbert, Yoder and Thomas are used interchangeably.
9° See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-19. See also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399 n. I. Although the sincerity of
belief may he examined, the courts have noted that the truth of a claimant's belief may not be. See
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
"' See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-19; see, e.g. , Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); see also Callahan v. Woods, 479 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (plaintiff's refusal to
disclose social security number was found to be rooted in religious belief because he believed the
number to be the "mark of the beast").
92
 This centrality requirement, though implicitly required by the Court, has not been explicitly
stated. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-22, 394 P.2d 813,
817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr, 69, 73-74 (1964).
470	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:463
act or regulation." In applying the test, the Court must weigh the degree to which the
challenged regulation interferes with an important religious practice against the impor-
tance of the regulation or action." Finally, the courts must analyze the impact of the
exemption from compliance with the regulation on the state program and the availability
of a less restrictive alternative." An important state interest, therefore, will not justify an
infringement of first amendment rights unless a religious exemption would impede the
furtherance of the government interest."
B. Judicial Approaches to 'Religion"
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court enunciated a test for first amendment
violations. Vague standards, however, have made this test difficult for lower courts to
apply. The Supreme Court has offered little guidance to the lower courts in interpreting
the terms "religion" and "religious" for purposes of first amendment analysis. In fact, the
Court has avoided restrictive definitions of these terms." The Court has consistently
recognized the religious nature of unorthodox creeds and has never imposed ideological
requirements for first amendment protection. 98 Instead, the Court has focused on
whether the belief or practice at issue fulfills a religious function."
Although the Supreme Court has never interpreted the terms "religion" or "reli-
gious" in a constitutional context, it has done so in a statutory one. In United States v.
Seeger' and Welsh v. United States,' the Court concluded that the unconventionality of a
religious practice could not preclude first amendment protection.' In interpreting the
Selective Service Act" which exempts from the draft individuals who object to fighting
on "religious" groun`ds, the Court adopted a broad reading of religion." The Court in
Seeger asserted that the belief in a Supreme Being included any belief that "occup[ied] the
same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one
clearly qualified for exemption."'" Similarly, in Welsh, the Court extended its definition of
religious belief to encompass all beliefs the petitioner characterized as religious as long as
93 See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) ("it is necessary in a
free exercise case to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against ... the practices
of religion"). The requirement of establishing a burden by demonstrating that a government act has
a tendency to impair a religious practice represents an elaboration on the concept of coercion. See
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 219.
" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
9' See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
99 Id.
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. Incl. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)
("religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection").
98 See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). The Court noted that "it is no
business of the courts to say what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not a religion
under the protection of the First Amendment." Id.
99 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). See also Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV, L. REV, 1056, 1072-75 (1978).
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
l" Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184-85; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.
'" The Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (1982).
994 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184-85.
'" Id. at 184.
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he embraced them with the strength of traditional religious convictions.'" The Welsh
decision eliminated the requirement of belief in God for exemption from the statute.'"
The Court suggested that strength and fundamentality of belief, rather than orthodoxy
of belief, are determinative of religious character.'"
The first amendment then protects a broad range of religious interests. Sherbert and
Yoder require that before a religious abridgement. as a result of a governmental act is
permitted by the courts, an important government interest must be served.'" In outlining
the balancing test, the Court required close scrutiny of the government program."° The
government's burden in challenging a free exercise claim is not merely to show that the
practice interferes with an important policy interest, but also to show that accommodation
of the religious interest would specifically harm its interests." Finally, the government
must demonstrate that it could not implement its policy without adopting less intrusive
means."2
Various cases have applied the balancing test to Native Americans' free exercise
claims in general. In addition to these cases, this note will examine how a Congressional
act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, may aid the courts in applying the test
to these claims. Finally, it will focus on Native Americans' claims involving the public use
of land and will demonstrate how the difficulties evidenced in the Native American cases
in general recur in this context and how AIRFA may be useful in alleviating these
problems.
II. NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. The Balancing Approach Adopted by the Lower Courts
Courts have purported to use the free exercise analysis of Sherbert and Yoder in a
number of cases involving claims by Native Americans. Three major areas of claims
illustrate how courts have applied this approach: peyote use; hair length; and animal
protection." 3
 The discrepancy in the outcome of such cases suggests the lack of a
coherent method of applying the Supreme Court's balancing test to Native American
claims, as well as flaws in the test itself. In the context of Native American claims,
problems of delineating what constitutes a religion within the meaning of the first
amendment become problems of determining what constitutes a burden on religion and
of according the appropriate weight to the interests involved. These problems also appear
in the context of Native American land claims.
Recent cases involving peyote, an hallucinogenic used in religious ceremonies, under
the free exercise clause have protected not only users who are members of the Native
American Church but also users who are not affiliated with a formal religious organiza-
'm Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343.
107 See, e.g., Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342 -44.
1" Id. at 343.
'" See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
"° Id.
" 1 Id. at 236.
' 1 ' See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
See generally Note, Native Americans and the Free Exercise Clause, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1509 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Native Americans].
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tion.' In People v. Woody, the California Supreme Court held that peyote use for religious
purposes was protected activity under the free exercise clause. 3 's In Woody, Navajos were
arrested while engaging in a peyote ritual and convicted of violating drug laws. " 6 The
California Supreme Court overturned their convictions.'" Relying heavily on Sherbert, the
Court concluded that the statute prohibiting drug use in this context burdened the
Navajos' free exercise of religion and the state interest in preventing drug use did not
justify the infringement." 8
 The Court found that the proscription of peyote use was
tantamount to prohibiting the religion itself.'" The plaintiffs therefore established a
burden on their free exercise, according to the Court.' 2° The Court rejected- the state's
argument that peyote use was deleterious to the Native American community and bur-
dened the state's enforcement of drug laws."'
In Whitehorn v. State, however, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that religious use
of peyote is permitted only if an individual can show formal membership in the Native
American Church." In Whitehorn, the court reviewed a defendant's conviction for illegal
use of peyote.'" Despite testimony attesting to his membership, the defendant could not
convince the court of his membership because the Church did not keep formal records.'"
The court then suggested that the Native American Church maintain membership rolls to
protect its members from drug convictions.' 25
 In imposing this requirement, the court
departed from the traditional protection afforded unorthodox religion as well as the
focus on personal beliefs rather than organizational attributes.'""- 8 The decisions in Woody
and Whitehorn indicate the inconsistent interpretations of Sherbert and Yoder in affording
protection to the religious use of peyote.
Courts have also been inconsistent in applying the principles of Sherbert and Yoder in
cases involving regulation of hair length. For Native Americans who assert that uncon-
trolled hair length is a necessary component of their religious practice, courts are in
disagreement as to what extent the first amendment protects the practice. and exempts
Native Americans from hair length regulations."' The source of the conflict is whether
hair length constitutes a religious practice' 28 and if so, how much first amendment
Id. at 1518. See, e.g., State-V. -
 Whittingliam, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 946 (1974); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). But see
Golden Eagle v. Johnson, 493 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (holding
that a Native American in possession of peyote is still subject to temporary incarceration despite the
law's recognition of the right to the religious use of peyote); United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp.
595 (D.N.D. 1984).
1 " 61 Cal. 2d 716, 717, 394 P.2d 813, 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (1964).
116 Id.
t" Id.
1 ' Id. at 718-26, 394 P.2d at 816 -20, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72
-76.
118 Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
1 " Id.
121 Id. at 722-23, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
'22 561 P.2d 539, 544 (Okla. Crim. 1977).
' 23 Id.
124 Id. at 542-46.
12' Id. at 458.
128
 See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
i" See infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., New Rider v. Board of Education, 480 F,2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1097 (1973). In dissenting in the denial of certiorari in New Rider, Justice Douglas argued that
hairlength may he protected by free speech guarantees if not free exercise guarantees. 414 U.S. at
1101 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This argument points to the difficulty our legal system has in applying
constitutional protection to alien value systems and divergent religions.
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protection it warrants. 129
 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the first
amendment requires exemption from hair length regulations for Native Americans with
religious beliefs about long hair. 130
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held
that any infringement on first amendment rights regarding hair length is insubstantial. 131
In New Rider v. Board of Education, three Pawnee students challenged a junior high
school regulation prohibiting long hair. 132
 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the regulation did not violate any of the
plaintiffs' religious rights.' 33
 In analyzing the claims, the court inquired whether the
beliefs about hair length were generally recognized by Native Aniericans.' 34 The court
reasoned that because hair length was not a fundamental liberty, the regulation did not
impinge on religious interests and no need existed to apply the Sherbert and Yoder
balancing test.'35
 In any case, the court asserted, maintaining school discipline was an
important state interest outweighing an individual's religious interest in hair length.' 36
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a different result on the same issue. In
Teterud v. Burns, a warden of a state penitentiary appealed a lower court decision holding
that the prison's prohibition against long hair violated the first amendment rights of a
Native American inmate. In Unlike the New Rider court, the Teterud court stressed that the
orthodoxy of the individual's beliefs was not open to judicial determination.'"' Further-
more, the court found that the health and safety interests in the prison did not outweigh
the individual's religious interest .' 33
 Thus, the court concluded that the Native Americans
asserted a protectable first amendment interet.' 4 °
Finally, courts are also inconsistent in cases in which Native Americans have invoked
the first amendment as a defense to prosecutions for sales of protected animal parts.
Animal parts are often an essential part of Native American religious ceremonies."'
Where such religious practices involve endangered species, courts have agreed that the
first amendment does not afford Native Americans protection because of the overriding
state interest in protecting endangered species." Courts have disagreed, however, on the
degree of protection Native Americans may receive in cases involving the taking and
possession of non-endangered species in connection with religious ceremonies.'" The
balance between the weight accorded to competing interests of religion on the one hand,
and curtailing dissemination of animal parts on the other, therefore, is unresolved.
The cases on peyote use, hair length, and animal parts illustrate the difficulty the
courts have had in applying the balancing test to an unfamiliar religion. Courts have
employed different approaches in ascertaining whether the claims are religious and have
'29 See, e.g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
' 3' Id. at 362.
'" New Rider, 480 F.2d at 695.
t32 Id.
' 33 Id. at 696.
1" Id.
13' Id. at 698.
Id.
137
	 522 F.2d at 359.
'" Id. at 360.
130 Id. at 361.
140 Id.
141 See Native Americans, supra note 113, at 1530-33.
See,e.g., United States v. Bushyhead, Magistrate's No. 74-117M (W.D. Okla. June 18, 1974).
143 See Wisconsin v. Funmaker No. 003042 (Juneau County, Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
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accorded different weights to the same interest. These inconsistencies in approach and
outcome, and misinterpretations of Sherbert and Yoder recur in. the specific context of
Native American challenges to government use of lands. To understand better the
religious basis for these claims and the weight to be accorded these religious interests in
land, this note will examine AIRFA before examining the land claims.
B. American Indian Religious Freedom Act
In recognition of its past insensitivity to American Indian religious rights, Congress
passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 1978.' 44 AIRFA reaffirms Native
Americans' free exercise rights by recognizing that their "inherent right to ... exercise ...
their religion" includes, among other rights, the right of access to sites.'" The act's
legislative history indicates that denying access to sites is not merely a cultural affront to
Native 'Americans, but also "analogous to preventing a non-Indian from entering his
church or temple." 146 Although AIRFA does not seem to confer a right of action on
American Indians,'" it does impose a duty on administrative agencies to implement
policies and procedures consistent with the end of the act: avoiding government interfer-
ence with American Indian religious practice.'"
AIRFA, then, should bolster the Native Americans' claims that their practices are
religious and that access to certain lands is central to their religion. Not only does it
recognize the import of access to sites, but also it recognizes that religion is an "integral
part" of Indians' traditional culture.'" AIRFA thus gives substance to the free exercise
clause in the context of relations between the government and Native American and the
administration of public lands.
C. Claims Involving Government Use of Public Lands
Since 1977, Native Americans have invoked the first amendment's free exercise clause
in cases involving governmental land use.' 6° In all but one case, the Native Americans
144 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
145 See H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 1262, 1263.
46 Id. at 1263. The legislative history stipulates that "there is no overriding reason to deny
Indians the right to inter their dead in sanctified ground."Id. Congress refers to the fact that Indians
were denied access to lands placed under federal supervision specifically because they were Indian
cemeteries. Id.
' 47 See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). Congress intended the act to provide administrative remedies.
AIRFA has been construed narrowly as requiring administrative agencies to consider and attempt to
accommodate Native American religious interests but not to defer to them. See Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 793 (D.S.C. 1982) (AIRFA
"does not create a cause of action in federal courts for violation of rights in religious freedom");
accord Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Clark, 593 F. Supp. 257 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). Under this
reading of the AIRFA, the Peterson court found a violation of the first amendment but no violation of
AIRFA. 565 F. Supp. at 597. For a slightly broad construction of AIRFA, see Peyote Way Church of
God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Stipp. 632 (N.D. Tex. 1983); see also United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp.
595 (D.N.D. 1984) ("Congress has a power or duty to the Indians to preserve their dependant nations
as a cohesive culture .... In the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996, Congress
has recognized this duty").
14" H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1262,
1262.
'" Id. at 1265.
14 See supra note 9.
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have failed to obtain first amendment protection. 15 ' The inconsistencies and difficulties in
interpreting the Yoder and Sherbert balancing tests and applying the tests to Native
American claims are accentuated in this context. In five cases where claims failed, two
courts reasoned that the practices the Native Americans sought to protect were not within
the ambit of religion; ' 52 two courts reasoned that the infringement on religion was
inconsequential;'" and one court held that the government interest involved outweighed
any religious interest.'" In most of these cases, the courts improperly applied the Yoder
and Sherbert test. 155 Only in Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson 156 did
the court properly apply the Yoder test and hold that the first amendment protected the
Native Americans from the proposed government activity."'
1. Failure to Find a Religious Interest
In Sequoyah v. TVA "8 and Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States,'" Native
American challenges to government management of public property failed because the
interests asserted by the Native Americans were not religious, according to the courts.'"
Both courts overlooked evidence pointing to a religious interest and therefore warranting
evaluation under the Sherbert and Yoder test. In Sequoyah, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that flooding of the Little Tennessee Valley did not
abridge Cherokee religious rights,"' finding that the Indians failed to establish the
religious significance of the area to be flooded.'" In Sequoyah, Cherokees sought an
injunction prohibiting the completion of the Tellico Dam, a project authorized by Con-
gress in 1966. 1 " Bringing a class action on behalf of "all those present or future Cherokee
Indians who practice the traditional Cherokee religion and adhere to Cherokee Indian
tradition and culture,"' 84 the plaintiffs claimed that completion of the dam and the
consequent flooding of the Little Tennessee Valley would destroy sacred sites, ceremonial
medicine gathering sites, holy places, and cemeteries.'" Furthermore, the Cherokees
alleged additional infringements on their religious interests because they believed that the
waters would preclude contact with the supernatural world by making worship sites
inaccessible in the Little Tennessee Valley.'"
' 5 ' See supra note 11.
152 Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v.
United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982). See infra notes 158-246 and
accompanying text.
1 " Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See infra notes 301-65 and accompanying text.
154 Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 277 -305 and accompanying text.
' 55 See infra notes 158-382 and accompanying text.
154 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D, Cal. 1982).
'" id. at 591.
L'A 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
' 5 ' 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982).
'" Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164-65; Inupiat, 548 F. Supp. at 189.
1 e' Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
iti1
1" Id. at 1160-61.
'Si id. at 1160.
168 Id. In addition, the plaintiffs based their claims on the fifth and ninth amendments to the
United States Constitution, AIRFA, the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 -
470(w)-6, and various laws of the state of Tennessee. Id.
' 66
 Id, at 1162.
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Holding that the free exercise clause does not create a right to use government
property to advance a religious purpose, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee dismissed the suit.' The Sixth Circuit rejected this reasoning,
holding that first amendment protection does not require a property interest.' 's The
court also asserted that the Cherokees' lack of standard organizational arid doctrinal
manifestations of religion did not preclude a first amendment claim."'" Consequently, the
court found that the Cherokees had a "religion" within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion,"° and that the Cherokees' religious beliefs were sincere."'
With a religion and sincerity of belief established, the court applied the Yoder analysis
to evaluate the "quality of claims." 17" In applying the Yoder test, however, the Sixth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs' affidavits failed to establish the indispensability or centrality of
the Little Tennessee Valley to the Cherokee religion.'" Because Yoder requires that before
first amendment protection is considered by the court a practice must be shown to be
"rooted in religious belief," 174 the Sequoyah court sought to ascertain whether the
Cherokees' land-related practices were religious.' The court found no substantial reli-
gious interest that warranted preserving the sites.'" In making this determination, the
court noted that worship of the geographical location in question was not inseparable
from the Cherokees' way of life,' 77 was not the cornerstone of their religious obser-
vance," and was not central to their religious ceremonies.'" The Sequoyah court asserted
that the flooding of the Little Tennessee Valley would result in cultural impairment
rather than religious impairment. 18° Cultural impairment, the court correctly concluded,
is not protected by the Constitution.'"' It therefore denied the Cherokees relief.' Be-
cause it found no religious interest, the court never applied the remainder of the Yoder
test to determine whether the interests burdened outweighed the state interest involved.
In Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope u. United States,' the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska employed similar reasoning. The Inupiat court held that the
federal government's leasing of seas which a Native American tribe claimed were sacred
did not burden the free exercise of the plaintiffs' religion.'" The Inupiat tribe sought to
quiet title to an area lying three to sixty-five miles offshore in the Beaufori. and Chucki
Seas, which the government had leased to oil companies.' 85 One of the theories on which
the Inupiats rested their case was that their religious beliefs and practices, inextricably
187 Id. at 1161. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (ED, Tenn. 1979).
188 620 F.2d at 1164.




173 Id. at 1163-64.
174 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
175 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163-64.
178 Id. at 1164.
177 Id.; see, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
1711 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164; see, e.g., Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
179 See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 1'.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1164.
181 Id. at 1164-65.
182. Id. at 1165.
183 548 F. Supp, 182, 188-89 (D. Alaska 1982).
184 548 F. Supp. at 188-89.
188 Id. at 185.
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linked to their hunting and gathering lifestyle, would be abridged by offshore exploratory
activities.'" The lnupiat sought injunctive relief, damages, and a declaration of their title
to the area based on immemorial use and occupancy.' 87
The court found that neither of the two elements required by the Yoder decision —
burden on religion and a religious interest which outweighs a state interest — were
present in the I nupiat first amendment claim.'" The-claim, according to the court, was
therefore without foundation.'" Because the plaintiffs offered no explanation of the
significance of the religious sites at issue, the court saw no basis for the claim that the
defendant's activity interfered with the plaintiffs' exercise of religion.'" The court also
noted that the plaintiffs failed to define how the government. activity would disrupt.
appeasement ceremonies." Such "non :specific"' 92
 claims, the court held, were inade-
quate to establish that the government's action constituted a "serious obstacle" to religious
exercise under the Yoder test.'" Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
exploratory activities should be prohibited on free exercise grounds.'" The court rea-
soned that the result of such a prohibition, carried to its extreme, would be "a vast
religious sanctuary over the Arctic seas beyond the state's territorial waters."'" The court
weighed the government's interests — specific needs of energy resources and treaty
obligations to keep the high seas open for passage and fishing — against the generalized
claims of the Inupiat and concluded that the Inupiat's claims were insufficient to out-
weigh the government interests.'" Consequently, the court held that the Inupiat's claims
failed to meet not only the burden on religion requirement of Yoder, but also the
balancing test requirements of Yoder.'"
The Sequoyah and Thupiat courts tailed to apply the Sherbert and Yoder balancing test
properly because they failed to find a valid religious interest. The Sequoyah court charac-
terized the Cherokees' religious practices as "cultural" rather than religious.'" Conse-
quently, the court found that these practices were precluded from first amendment
protection.'" Similarly, the Inupiat court found the Intipiats' claims too generalized to
constitute a religious interest.'" An examination of the facts of these cases in light of the
claimants' beliefs,'" Supreme Court interpretations of religion,' 62 and Al RFA 20'3 suggest
that the Sequoyah and blupiat courts should have found the Native Americans' practices to
be "religious" within the meaning of the first amendment.
ISO Id. at 188-89.
' 7 Id. at 185.
1" Id. at 188.
'" Id. at 188-89.
199 Id.
1 " Id. at 188.






"'" Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164-65.
199 Id.
200 Inupiat, 548 F. Supp. at 1H8-89.
'' See infra notes 204-31 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 28-112 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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The Sequoyah court cites a number of affidavits filed by the plaintiffs.'" Information
contained in these affidavits demonstrates that the site was not only of cultural sig-
nificance as the birthplace of the Cherokees, but of religious significance as an ancestral
burial ground. Statements included prose by medicine men referring to the Little Ten-
nessee Valley as "our connection with the Great Spirit."'" According to the statements,
the medicine men believed that "if these lands are flooded they will destroy the spiritual
strength of the Cherokee people."'" In addition, several anthropologists testified regard-
ing the significance of these places to the Cherokee Indian tradition and religion and the
importance of their remaining undisturbed. 201
 The court itself conceded that specific
geographic sites, because of belief in the transmission of spiritual and cultural knowledge,
as well as ancestor worship, figure more prominently in Indian religions than in other
religious.'" Nevertheless, despite the extrinsic documentation of the significance of
the region to the Cherokees, and the conceded sincerity of their beliefs, the court found
that the Cherokees had no religious interest in the religious sites.'" The court found that
the affidavits submitted bided to establish the centrality or indispensability of the sites to
Cherokee religious practices."' The court deemed the sanctity of the sites to be a
"personal preference" rather than convictions "shared by an organized group."'" The
court found that the flooding of the sites would impair "tribal and family folklore and
traditions" — Cherokee culture which is not constitutionally protected — rather than
Cherokee religion."' This artificial and arbitrary dichotomy imposed by the court reflects
a misunderstanding of, and insensitivity to, Native American beliefs and lifestyle. One
dissenting judge highlighted the fallacy of the court's reasoning, arguing that the stan-
dard for establishing centrality had never been clearly articulated." 3 For this reason, he
continued, the case should have been remanded to afford the Cherokees an opportunity
to establish the centrality of the land-related practices to their religion." 4
The Sequoyah court's conclusion that the Cherokees had no religious interest in the
sites at issue directly contradicts the broad definition and protection traditiOnally ac-
corded religion by the courts. 215 The courts have consistently determined that. religion
encompasses almost every ideology having a relation to an individual's fundamental
beliefs."" Under constitutional analysis, spiritual practice need not be organized to be
characterized as religious.'" The Sequoyah court itself recognized that a group need not
meet organizational or doctrinal standards to invoke first amendment protection." 9
Organization is often a factor in ascertaining whether a practice is religious, but it is not a




2" Id. at 1163.
209
 Id. at 1164.
210 Id.
I " Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216).
212 Id. at 1164.
213 Id. at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
214 Id.
212
 See supra notes 28-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the free exercise right.
21 " See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial approaches to
religion.
2 ' 7
 See, e.g., Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
218
 Id. at 1163.
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determinative factor,"" nor is conventionality a requirement for religious protection
under the first amendment."Y 0 Although tribes do not generally convene for services in
the traditional, organized manner, they are unified by common spiritual traditions."'
Oral tradition preserves beliefs and practices over time and hierarchical religious struc-
tures exist in many tribes. 222
 These aspects of tribal life, along with evidence linking
Cherokee practices and ritual to their beliefs, should have convinced the Sequoyah court of
the religious character of the Cherokee's beliefs.
Cherokees believe that communication with the Great Spirit is achieved by worship at
sacred places. 223
 With Little Tennessee Valley sacred to the Cherokees, and survival of the
communities contingent on worship, 224 the Sequoyah court's failure to find worship at these
sites to be central to the plaintiff's religion is startling. The Sequoyah court based this
conclusion on language in Yoder."'" Because it did not find an intimate relation between
belief and daily conduct as the Yoder court had, the court ruled that the requisite centrality
was lacking."' Nothing in Yoder, however, suggests that finding such a relationship is the
appropriate test for centrality. Rather, the focus of a centrality test is the importance of a
practice to a larger religious system."-7
 Under this test, the inference can be made that the
practices of the Cherokees are fundamental to their religion." 8 The threat of undermin-
ing the Cherokee community and religious practice as a result of the government's
abridgement of Cherokee land use was as great as it was for the Amish as a result of
compulsory education."" Even if the language in Yoder did constitute a test for centrality
the Cherokee beliefs arguably met that standard; the impact of the Cherokee ceremonies
is felt daily."30
 Because the Cherokee religious practices are essential to the continued
survival of their religion and are an integral part of their culture, 231
 the court erred when
it failed to find the practice central or indispensable to Cherokee religion.
Additional support for the argument that the practices and access to land were
central to the Cherokee religion is found in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act.
2 " See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (Amish beliefs were "shared by an organized group" and
could therefore be construed as religious). See also Washington Ethical Society v. District of Colum-
bia, 249 F.2d 127,128 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (in evaluating nontheistic practice, organization is considered).
220 See, e.g., Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127,129 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(to construe exemptions so strictly that unorthodox or minority forms of worship would be denied
the exemption benefits granted to those conforming to the majority beliefs might well raise constitu-
tional issue); see also Callahan v. Woods, 479 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ca]. 1979).
221
 See generally Casenote, Native American Free Exercise Rights and the Federal Use of Public Land, 63
B.U. L. REV. 141, 162 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Casenote, Native American Free Exercise Rights).
222 Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 161-62.
224 Id. at 163 & n.12.
'° The Sequoyah court relied on the following language: "the traditional way of life of the Amish
is not merely a matter of personal preference but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group, and intimately related to daily living," Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164 (quoting Yoder,
406 U.S. at 215-16).
2" Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
227 See, e.g., Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Alaska 1979) (evaluating the role of
consuming moose meat at a funeral potlatch); People v. Woody, 61 Cat. 2d 716, 720-22, 394 P.2d
813, 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73-74 (1964) (evaluating role of peyote use in worship in the Native
American Church). See generally Note, Native Americans, supra note 113, at 1509.
420 See generally Casenote, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 221, at 161-62.
220 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
13° See generally Casenote, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 221, at 161-63.
"I Id.
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AIRFA specifically recognizes access to sites as a significant religious right. 232 The court
ignored this recognition in applying its centrality test. to the Cherokees' situation. The
Sequoyah court's distinction between religion and culture is erroneous and indicative of the
"lack of knowledge, unawareness, insensitivity, and neglect [which] are keynotes of the
federal government's interaction with traditional Indian [sic] religious and cultures." 2"
In light of AIRFA, judicial interpretations of religion, and the claimants' religious
beliefs, the court's reasoning in Inupial may be faulty as well. Like the Sequoyah court, the
Inupiat court found centrality lacking. The court's finding the Inupiat claims
"nonspecific" and "without definition""" perhaps reflects a lack of understanding about,
and insensitivity to, Native Americans' religious needs. Evidence presented to the court
stressed the sanctity of sites on'sea-ice as well as land because of the presence of spirits." 35
The defendants' activities threatened both to preclude access to and to violate these
sites. 2" Sacred sites are not limited to land as the court asserted, but include river mouths
and sea-ice. 227 Because of the integration of religion with subsistance life for the Inupiat,
the continued productivity of the sea-ice environment and the prosperity of animals who
live there, in particular the whale, are indispensable to religious observances. 238 The
Inupiat court's rejection of the claims on grounds of vagueness suggests a rejection on
grounds of unconventionality — grounds explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court as
unacceptable."'
Although the Inupiat court found no protectable religious interest, it nevertheless
proceeded with a balancing of interests, the second part of the Yoder test.' In its analysis,
the court confused free exercise analysis with establishment clause analysis. 24 ' Rather than
focusing on the infringement of religious practices, the court focused on the required
belief to conclude no burden on religion was established by the Inupiat claims: "[T]heir
contention would result in the creation of a vast religious sanctuary over the Arctic seas
beyond the state's territorial waters. A claim to such a large area based on such non-
specific grounds cannot provide the sort of "serious obstacle" contemplated by Yoder." " 41
The Inupiat court therefore misconstrued and misapplied Yoder when it initially found no
religious interest and subsequently failed to analyze the degree of infringement against
the government interest.
In finding no religious interest the Sequoyah and Inupiat courts reached results
"' See supra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
235 H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News
1262, 1265. The legislative history elaborates on this point: "This state of affairs is enhanced by the
perception of many non-Indian officials that because Indian religious practices are different than
their own that they somehow do not have the same status as areal' religion." Id. The Sequayah court
may be guilty of the same misperception.
234 I nupiat, 548 F. Supp. at 188-89.
235 Plaintiffs' Memo in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at
124-25, Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982).
236 Id. For these Native Americans, any area furnishing subsistence resources is sacred. Id. at
125. Defendants' activity allegedly threatened both the environment and animal life which are
central to the Inupiat religious beliefs. Id. at 124.
234 Id. at 125.
2" Id. at 126.
255 See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial treatment of
religion.
244 /nu . •pat 548 F. Supp. at 189.
241 See supra note 11.
242 548 F. Supp. at I89; see supra note I I.
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inconsistent with prior judicial examinations and treatment of religion. 243 AIRFA also
illustrates the inappropriateness of their findings."' Evidence in Mupiat indicates that a
religious interest should have been found. Only after a religious interest is found should
the courts have analyzed the burden on religion and balanced the interests involved. The
Yoder test would have required the government in Sequoyah to prove that its interests in the
Tellico Dam outweighed the Native Americans' religious interests in public lands and that
less restrictive alternatives did not exist."' Applying Yoder, the bzupiai court should have
first found a religious interest in the Arctic Seas and then balanced that interest against
the government interest in leasing seas. 246
2. Failure to Pass the Balancing Test
Unlike the Sequoyah and Inupiat courts, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found a religious interest in the Navajos' claims in Badoni v. Higginson." 7 Although the
court conceded that a religious interest existed in Badoni, the court held that the govern-
ment interest in maintaining the water level of Lake Powell overrode the religious interest
of the Navajos." 4$ The Badoni court reached this result after failing to analyze the
infringement on the interest. It also failed to afford due weight to the religious interests in
its balancing needs as Yoder requires:249
In Badoni, religious leaders of the Navajos sought to enjoin the federal government
from operating Glen Canyon Darn and Reservoir, on free exercise grounds. 25° According
to the state, the dam was an integral part of the Colorado Water Storage Project for the
development of power generation, irrigation, mineral exploration, and protection of
municipal and industrial water supplies. 25 ' The plaintiffs objected to a plan which entailed
the flooding of the Rainbow Bridge National Monurnent. 252 Rainbow Bridge, contiguous
to the Navajo Reservation, housed an arch sacred to the Navajo." 53 Several of the gods
who Navajos believed inhabited the natural formations had already been drowned by the
creation of the reservoir. 254 The plaintiffs argued that their religious ceremonies would be
ineffective if not held on the habitation site of the surviving spirits:253 Additionally, the
plaintiffs claimed that by desecrating the sacred site and denying Navajos access to the
sacred prayer spot, the government had abridged their free exercise rights. 256
The district court rejected the Navajo claims asserting that the plaintiff's had no
property interest in the lands at issue:257 Furthermore, the distict court found that no first
amendment protection was available because the sites had no religious significance to an
243 See supra notes 46-112 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act.
▪ See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, 226.
296 Id.
"7 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
2911 Id.
• See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
Bodoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
"' id. at 176.




256 Id. at 176.
x57
	 v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Utah 1977).
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organized group. 26' Finally, the district court reasoned that the government's interest in
water supply outweighed any of the Navajo's interests. 269
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the plain-
tiff's lack of property rights in the National Monument was determinative of their
claim,'" but affirmed the lower court's holding.'''' Employing a centrality test to evaluate
the quality of the claims,'"' the court recognized that Rainbow Bridge and the vicinity had
long held positions of central importance in the Navajo beliefs: "[The] shrines are
regarded as the incarnate forms of Navajo Gods, which provide protection and rain-
giving functions." 263 The appeals court therefore found that the plaintiffs had a religious
interest in the Glen Canyon Darn and reservoir.'" The operation of the dam and Lake
Powell, the court acknowledged, had submerged the sacred springs and prayer spot, and
tourists had desecrated the bridge with noise and litter. 266 Nevertheless, the circuit court
agreed with the district court that the government's interest was so compelling that it
outweighed any religious interest. 266 In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court never
addressed the question of whether the government action actually infringed on the
plaintiff's free exercise rights.'"'
The Tenth Circuit in Badoni misapplied the Yoder test it purported to employ.
Concerning the Navajo claim that impounding water to form Lake Powell violated their
first amendment rights, the court ostensibly sought to apply the Yoder test by seeking to
ascertain the quality of the religious claims and the nature of the infringement. 269 The
court, however, abandoned the Yoder analysis when it asserted that the government's
interest was so compelling that it overrode any religious interest of the plaintiffs. 269 The
Yoder test insures that due weight be accorded government and religious needs. Assuming
that the Glen Canyon project justified an abridgement of religious rights, the court still
should have investigated the possibility ofa'dopting alternative means. The court, how-
z." Id. at 645 -46.
±" Id. at 646-47.
"° Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176.
:MI Id.
"2




'1" Id. at 177, n.4.
187 Id. The circuit court also denied relief to the Navajos regarding government management of
the National Monument. Id. at 181. The plaintiffs sought "some measured accommodation to their
religious interest, not a wholesale bar to use of Rainbow Bridge by all others." Id. at 178. Traditional
free exercise claims, however, involve challenges to government actions that either compel prac-
titioners to violate tenets of their religion or condition a benefit or right on renunciation of a religious
practice. Id.; see supra notes 28-112 and accompanying text. Because the Navajos' claim resembled
neither of these traditional forms, the court denied the plaintiffs relief. Id. at 178, 181. The court
recognized the difficulties the plaintiffs would have in performing religious practices before tourists
but noted that the government had done nothing to prohibit the performance of these acts to justify
its holding. Id. at 178-79. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the government had an interest in
and a statutory duty to assure public access to natural wonders. Id. at 178. The court, in addition,
denied the relief of excluding tourists for short periods from the Monument on the basis that such
affirmative action on the part of the government implicated the establishment clause. Id. at 179. The
court further asserted that the plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to have tourists act in a
respectful manner. Id.
2" Id. at 176.
2" Id. at 177 n.4.
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ever, never addressed the issue of whether the government action infringed on the
plaintiff's religious interest,' or the possibility that the government might be able to use
less intrusive alternatives — in short, whether Navajo interests in public lands could be
protected. The Badoni court protected government interests it perceived as compelling
because of the impact of the project on large numbers of Atnericans.m In protecting that
interest, however, it overlooked the religious interest of a minority. This insensitivity to
the Native Americans' claims is inconsistent with the high place religious liberty has
maintained in our society as a fundamental value.'"
3. Failure to Find Infringement Resulting from Governmental Action
Insensitivity on the part of the courts to unconventional religious practices reappears
in two other cases involving Native Americans where no infringement on religion was
found. In Crow v. Gullet' and Wilson v. Block, 274 courts found a religious interest that may
have warranted first amendment protection, but concluded that the challenged govern-
ment action did not burden that interest."T I-lad the government action infringed on the
religious interest, the balancing test should have been applied and first amendment
protection possibly invoked." 78 This section will suggest that in light of the facts of each
case, the Wilson court should have proceeded to the balancing stage of the test, while the
Crow court properly did not.
In Crow v. Gullet the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in a per
curiam opinion, upheld a lower court's ruling that the development, construction and
regulatory actions of a State Park Manager did riot burden Native Americans' religious
exercises." 77 Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the
government activity infringed on their first amendment rights.'"`
In Crow, spiritual leaders of the Lakota and Tsistsistas nations brought suit against
the manager of Bear Butte State Park,'79 maintaining that the stale, by its development,
construction, and regulatory activity destroyed the sanctity of their religious cere-
monies."'° The defendants' activity, plaintiffs alleged, violated their constitutional and
statutory rights on several grounds. First, the resulting increase in tourism impaired
religious ceremonies."'" Second, access to sites was restricted during construction.'
Third, registration and camping permit requirements impermissibly burdened religious
exercise. And fourth, the manager failed to control tourists during religious practices.'"
The Lakota and Tsistsistas nations sought to enjoin not only construction projects or
170 See generally, Gianella, supra note 3, at 1385-90. Bodoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
27 ' Bodoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
'19 See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rpt r. 69, 77 (1964) ("the
right to free religious expression embodies the precious heritage of our history.").
273
	
F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
2" 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
275
	
706 F.2d at 858; Wilson, 708 F.2d at 741.
2" See supra notes 46-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing test,
221 Crow, 706 F.2d at 858.
178 Id.
270 Id. at 857.
See Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 787-88 (D.S.C. 1982)
" 1 Id. at 787.
"3 Id.
"3 Id. at 788.
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other alterations of the natural features of the butte, but also to remove roads, parking
lots, and buildings presently in place.'"
The district court in Crow applied the two part balancing test enunciated in Sherbert
and Thomas.' Under the test, a court must first ascertain whether a law, conduct or
regulation burdens the free exercise of religion.'"'' Second, the restriction on religion
must be balanced against the state's interest in the restriction. 287 Finally, less restrictive
alternatives must be explored.'"" According to the court, the plaintiffs met the prelimi-
nary requirements of the test by demonstrating that their practices at Bear Butte were
based on a religious system of belief and the belief's were genuinely held, 2 '9
 The district
court began its analysis by examining the alleged infringement on the plaintiff's prac-
tice.29° Relying on the defendant's contentions that worshippers in the past had urged the
state to improve access to the site, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to
establish that construction impinged on their free exercise rights. 2" 1 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the free exercise clause does not require that the government shirk
its duty to the public nor provide an environment conducive to religious acts. 292
The district court also found the Native Americans' other claims without merit: 293 For
example, the court found that restrictions on overnight camping in ceremonial ways
during construction did not constitute a burden on religion because the restrictions were
merely partial and temporary. 294 Furthermore, the court found no evidence in the record
of any person's being denied access to Bear Butte for religious purposes.'-' 95 The court
compared the alleged burden on religion to the burden in the Sequoyah and Bodoni cases
where flooding barred access to sites permanently and totally. The Crow court thus
concluded that no burden on religion was present in the case at har. 2"fl
According to the Crow court, the plaintiffs failed to establish that overnight. camping
was art indispensable part of their religion. 297 Nevertheless, the court applied the first part
of the balancing test and found that the state met its burden of proof by demonstrating a
compelling interest in the construction, based on environmental and administrative
reasons. 298 In addition, the court found this public and religious exclusion to be the least
restrictive means of completing the project. 299
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding that despite
the presence of a religious interest, no burden was imposed on that interest. 30° Construe-
2134 Id
2" Id. at 790.
2 '46 See supra notes 48 -88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sherbert.
2°7
 See supra notes 48-88 and accompanying text.
2"a
	 supra notes 48-88 and accompanying text.
2" Crow, 541 F. Stipp. at 790.
2" Id.
"' Id. at 791.
292 Id. In fact, defendants maintain the park in part to serve Indian worshippers. Sensitivity to
this purpose is indicated by the fact that educational facilities impart information about Indian
religions. Id. at 789.
293 Id. at 792-93.






3" Crow, 706 F.2d at 859.
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tion and development in this context was constitutionally permissible, according to the
court. 3° 1
Similarly, in Wilson v. Block, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that although the plaintiffs had a valid religious interest, gov-
ernment action did not impinge on the free exercise of that religious interest. 30• The
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. 303
In the lower court opinion of Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 304 the district court, relying
largely on Sequoyah for reasoning and factual similarities, had upheld two administrative
decisions which allowed private interests to expand a government-owned ski area. 305 In a
consolidated suit, the plaintiffs, the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Medicine Men's Associa-
tion, had brought suit against administrative officials and the United States.' Challeng-
ing the action on first amendment grounds, the plaintiffs sought not only to halt devel-
opment of a ski resort on peaks sacred to them, but also to remove existing facilities,'
The plaintiff's argued that government actions were destroying the character of a most
sacred shrine, and were therefore forcing adherents of the religion to modify their
religious doctrine to conform to changed circumstances. 308 Thus, the Indians claimed that
these government actions constituted a burden on their free exercise rights underSherbert
and Thomas."•
The court found that the plaintiffs met both the centrality and sincerity tests." The
Navajos believed artificial development of the peaks would impair the peaks' healing
powers.'" For the Hopis, use of the peaks for commercial purposes meant a direct affront
to their gods. 312 Reviewing the claim that the Indians had a religious interest in the area
and applying the centrality test of Sequoyah, the court then found that the peaks played a
central role in both the Navajo and Hopi religions. 313 Because the parties had stipulated
that the Indians' beliefs were both religious and sincere, 3 ' 4 the court proceeded directly to
its examination of the free exercise claims. Finding even less of an infringement on first
amendment rights than the denial of total access in Sequoyah, the court found no protecti-
ble religious interest.' The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling
that the expansion did not violate first amendment rights of Navajo and Hopi tribes.'
Specifically, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that because Native Americans were
301 Id. at. 858.
3°2 708 F.2d 735, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
3113 Id. at 739.
3" 8 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981).
"' Id. at 3076.
J"' Id. at 3073.
307 Wilson, 708 F•2d at 738. Plaintiffs alleged that the expansion of the ski area violated their
rights on several grounds. The court considered the following: Al RFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982); the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. ** 1536-1543 (1982); the National Hist. Preservation Act, 16
U.S.C. 470-470(w)-6 (1976); the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. *11131-1136 (1976) and 16 U.S.C.** 497,
551 (1976); as well as the free exercise clause. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739.
3" Wilson, 708 F.2d at 741.
a" Id.
3 ' 0 Id.
3 " Id. at 744-45.
3 ' 2 Id. at 738, 740.
3 ' 3 Id.
3 " Id. at 738.
315 Id. at 746.
318
 8 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING. PROGRAM) at 3076.
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not denied access to the peaks nor impaired in their ability to gather sacred objects or
conduct religious ceremonies, no impermissible burden on religion was demonstrated. 31 '
In an unusual analysis, the court first considered whether the belief's were burdened and
then if religious practices were burdened."'
In examining the impact of the ski resort development on the Navajos' and Hopis'
beliefs, the court rejected the applicability of the Sherbert and Thomas decisions. 315 The
court reasoned that Sherbert and Thomas were not factually analogous to the case at bar
because those cases held that the government may not, by conditioning benefits, penalize
religious beliels. 3'9 Although the court recognized that the construction of the proposed
facilities was inconsistent with the plaintiff's beliefs, the court ruled that spiritual disquiet
does not comprise a free exercise claim under Sherbert and Thomas, or under Pillar of Fire
v. Denver Urban Renewal, where the Colorado Supreme Court held that a church group
whose building, imbued with religious and historic significance, was condemned by urban
renewal, was entitled to a court hearing to weigh the interests involved."' Relying on
Pillar of Fire, the court in Wilson acceded that "religious faith and tradition can invest
certain structures and land sites with significance which deserves first amendment protec-
tion."'" The court distinguished Pillar of Fire from the case at hand, however, on the
grounds that "a governmental taking of privately-owned religious property ... involves
different considerations than does a claimed first amendment right to restrict the gov-
ernment's use of its own land." 3"
Finding no burden on belief, the court of appeals considered whether expansion of
the ski resort burdened the practice of the Navajo and Hopi religions. 324 The plaintiffs
argued that the destruction of natural conditions in the peaks would impair the perfor-
mance of ceremonies and the collection of religious objects through desecration of sacred
shrines. 325 The plaintiffs objected to the lower court's reliance on Sequoyah vn two
grounds. First, the plaintiffs argued that Sherbert and Thomas provided the appropriate
standard to evaluate the burden on religion. 325 The plaintiffs asserted that the burden on
their religion was even greater than the burdens in Sherbert and Thomas, because in those
cases the plaintiffs could simply forego government benefits and continue to practice
their religion. 327 A broad reading of those cases, the plaintiffs argued, would condemn
governmental actions which force adherents either directly or indirectly, to modify their
beliefs and practices; the expansion of the ski area, by effectively prohibiting the practice
of their religion, would be such an action. 328 The Wilson court, however, reiterated its
rejection of the applicability of the Sherbert and Thomas decisions; which involved govern-
ment benefits, stating, "those cases did not purport to create a benchmark against which
to test all indirect burden clainas."329
317 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 741.
3" Id. at 744-45.
313 Id. at 746.
325 Id. at 741.
321 Id. at 741, 742 n.3 (citing Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal, 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d
1250 (1973)).
3" Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742 (citing Pillar of Fire, 181 Colo. at 419, 509 P.2d at 1254).
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Second, the plaintiffs argued that the court's reliance on the Sequoyah decision was
misplaced because the Sequoyah court misinterpreted the first amendment by requiring
proof of centrality.'" Although the Wilson court rejected the centrality doctrine, it as-
serted that Sequoyah required a showing of 'indispensability, rather than centrality, of a
geographic site to the plaintiff's religion."' The focus in an indispensability test is on the
importance of a geographic site to the practice of the plaintiffs' religion regardless of its
centrality, according to the court."' Relying on the analysis of the Sequoyah court, the
Wilson court enunciated a standard for establishing a burden on religion under the free
exercise clause when the use of government land is involved."' in light of the importance
of the government's property rights and its duties to manage land for the public be-
nefit,' the court required that the plaintiffs demonstrate at a minimum that the govern-
ment's proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could not be performed
elsewhere."'
The plaintiffs argued that, even under this standard that accords heavy weight to the
governmental interest, they had established a violation of first amendment rights. 33 °
Despite evidence that all of the peaks were sacred and indispensable to their religious
practices, however, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that development
of the area would impede the practice of their religion, 337 reasoning that a guarantee of
access to the peaks ensured the plaintiff's free exercise rights.'" The court did not
consider whether the ski area expansion constituted a compelling government interest."°
The claims of Native Americans in Wilson v. Block and Crow v. Gullet failed not
because the courts found no religious interest but because the courts found that no
religious impairment would result from the challenged government action.' The prob-
lem with the Native American claims in these cases was not in meeting the criteria of
"religion" but in meeting the criteria for establishing a burden on religion. 341 As with the
Sequoyah and Inupiat decisions, A1RFA and Supreme Court precedents are useful in
3" Id. A variety of interpretations of centrality relating to Native Americans' first amendment
claims have been employed by the courts. See, e.g., Teterud v. Gilman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa
1974), aff'd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (practice of wearing hair in
braids found to be central to religion because "it was an important aspect of the spiritual life of
Indians and a fundamental spiritual custom."); Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.M 1068 (Alaska 1979) (moose
meat found to be an essential requirement of a religious ceremony). Courts, however, have rejected
the centrality test because they are not equipped to "dictate which practices are or are not required in
a particular religion." Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 17 (D.D.C. 1976). See also
Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1032 -33 (S.D. Ohio
1984) ("What is not involved in the determination of centrality is an evaluation of which beliefs
asserted by the plaintiffs are more important or form the 'real' tenets of the plaintiffs' faith"). The
danger of the centrality test is the natural tendency to use familiar criteria to evaluate a practice (e.g.,
in Woody, peyote is likened to the Host). Courts then end up evaluating the substantive worth of
beliefs asserted in terms of their own. See Note, Religious Exemptions, supra note 89 at 360-62.
"' Wilson, 708 F.2d at 743.




136 Id. at 744-45 n.7.
'7 Id. at 744.
13' Id. at 745.
339
34° In both cases, parties stipulated that plaintiffs' beliefs were both religious and sincerely held.
541 See supra notes 273 -331 and accompanying text.
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evaluating the appropriateness of the courts' reasoning in the Crow and Wilson cases.
While the outcome of the Crow case is reasonable in light of these standards, the outcome
of the Wilson case is not. 342
Because the Wilson court found the plaintiffs' claims to be rooted in religion, it
proceeded to the first part of the balancing test — determining whether plaintiffs had
established a burden on a religious interest." 3 To analyze whether the expansion of a ski
resort infringed on Navajo and Flopi free exercise rights, the Wilson court, in an unusual
analysis, examined the effect of development on the plaintiffs' beliefs, and then the
burden on their religious practices."' Nothing in Sherbert or Thomas on which the Wilson
court relied, or in any other recent decision, requires this dichotomous analysis."
Given the broad protection accorded religion by the courts and Congress in
AIRFA,"6 the Wilson court's interpretation of Sherbert and Thomas was improper. The
Wilson court's reading of "burden" was unduly narrow. The form of the burden in Wilson
— where the plaintiffs were forced to modify their religious doctrine to conform to
changed circumstances, was not factually identical to conditioning a benefit upon conduct
proscribed by plaintiffs' beliefs — to the burden in Sherbert and Thomas."' Nevertheless,
the difference in form of burden should not have precluded the finding of a burden in
the instant case. in Thomas, where unemployment benefits were denied to a worker who
had resigned for religious reasons, the burden was "substantial pressure on an adherent
to modify his behavior . . . "34g Under Yoder, in which compulsory education was contrary
to the Amish religion, the facts of the case would establish a burden by threatening the
community and the religious practices.'"
The Wilson court undermined its own analysis by citing Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban
Renewal Authorily. 330 In the Pillar of Fire case, the burden on religion did not condition
benefits upon conduct abhorrent to the plaintiff's religion as did Sherbert and Thomas . 3"
Instead, it involved the possible destruction of a religiously significant structure and
site."' The court in Pillar of Fire asserted that because of the unique religious significance
of the condemned building, "Nile loss of the Pillar of Fire would allegedly go far beyond
the incidental burden of having to move to a new location which would occur if any
church building were condemned." 353 The Pillar of Fire court then recognized a potential
392 See supra notes 54-112, 144-49 and accompanying text.
"3 Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
349
	 dichotomy between belief and practice has been recognized since the 19th century. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S, 145 (1878). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(regulation of belief is prohibited; regulation of practice is permissible). The integration of religion
with lifestyle, however, has diminished the validity of this distinction.
345 Moreover, the Wilson court inexplicably failed to cite to or rely on Yoder.
346See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of AIRFA.
347 For the impact of the expansion on the Hopi's religion, see Brief for Appellant, Hopi Indian
Tribe, at 25-27, Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
34" Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
"" See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
"° 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973).
3'" Id. at 419, 509 P.2d at 1251.
352 Id.
'S3 Id. Another point of departure in the two courts' analyses is that while the Wilson court
trivializes the plaintiffs' claims by asserting that spiritual disquiet does not suffice to state a free
exercise claim, 708 F.2d at 742, the Pillar of Fire court stresses the need for judicial intervention to
protect a small, politically weak minority's first amendment rights when administrative and legislative
bodies have been insensitive to their interests. 181 Colo. at 419, 509 P.2d at 1251.
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free exercise claim in a non-traditional context and the breadth of protection religion
should be afforded.
In addition to applying Pillar of Fire improperly to the case, the Wilson court errone-
ously distinguished a government taking of private religious property, such as occurred in
Pillar of Fire, from a restriction on the government's use of its own land. 351 In so doing, the
court confused the weighing of interests with establishing the abridgement of religion;
the latter must necessarily precede the former." Furthermore, the interest to be consid-
ered should not be the government's use of the land generally, but rather the specific use
of land. In Wilson, the proposed use of land was not for energy development or water
supply purposes — purposes conceivably compelling because of the number of citizens
affected`''" — but for the development of a ski resort, involving private commercial
interests and benefiting a small population of skiers. 3"
The Wilson court's analysis of the burden on religious practices was as weak as its
analysis of the burden on belief. Concerning the burden on religious practices, the Wilson
court again improperly rejected the applicability of Sherbert and Thomas despite the
plaintiff's' argument that the burden on their religion was greater than the burden in the
Sherbert and Thomas cases.' In Sherbert and Thomas, the plaintiffs could have continued to
practice their religion by foregoing benefits, whereas in Wilson, the ski area effectively
prohibited the practice of the Native Americans' religion." In grappling with ascertain-
ing whether the government's action constituted a burden on religion, the Wilson court
outlined a standard for challenging proposed land use: the proposed land use must
impair a religious practice that could not be performed at any other site. 36° Using this
standard, the Wilson court reached an erroneous conclusion. The court ignored that all of
the peaks were sacred,361 and that the religious practices were "site-specific" and required
" natural conditions for their performance." 362 The standard itself is questionable because
it weighs heavily the government's .property rights and duties of public management
before analyzing how the specific government act impinges on the religious interest. 3°
Nothing, however, in the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sherbert and Yoder, or any other
case, suggests that a different or higher standard be imposed on cases involving the
federal use of public land. In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the first
amendment and the fourteenth amendment require states to allow religious proselytiza-
tion on public streets. 364 These cases, as well as AI RFA, which recognizes access to sites as
significant to Native Americans' religious freedom, suggest that access to public lands is an
element of first amendment protection."
3s4
	 708 F.2d at 742.
ass
	
supra notes 28-96 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the balancing test.
"6 See, e.g., Badoni v, Higginson, 638 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980).
3" See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
3" See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
Compare Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401 and Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, with Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742.
36° Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742.
"' Id. at 744.
332 Id. at 742.
33a
	
at 744. The court stated: "[i]n holding that government land uses can never burden the
right to freedom of belief, and can burden the right to freedom of practice only if site-specific
religious practices are significantly impaired, we pay due regard to the government's rights and
duties on its land." Id.
364 See, e.g., Kemp v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (impermissible to impose a license
requirement on religious speech); accord, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
383 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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The analysis in Wilson is also improper because it mixes elements of the balancing
stage of the Sherbert and Yoder test with the finding of a burden on religion. 366
 This analysis
leads to circular reasoning that because the government interest is compelling, no in-'
fringement on the plaintiffs' religion occurs. The Yoder test, applied properly after a
finding that a government action burdens the plaintiff's religion, would conclude that
because the government's interest outweighs the religious in a given instance, no violation
of the first amendment has occured. 367
 Given the evidence, the Wilson court should have
found an infringement on the plaintiffs' religion and then balanced the competing
interests. The interest of the ski resort owners probably would have yielded to the
religious interest had the court balanced the interests properly.
In contrast. to Wilson, the court in Crow v. Gullet properly applied the two part
balancing test of Sherbert and found no infringement on the plaintiffs' free exercise
rights.'" Unlike the court in Wilson, the Crow court did not offer separate analysis for
religious belief and practice.'" More significantly, in looking for a burden before apply-
ing the balanCing test, the court gave a broad reading to 'burden."'" Not only could the
plaintiffs have demonstrated that they were burdened because they were penalized by
adherence to their religion, but they also could have demonstrated that "their conduct in
the course of exercising their belief's had been unduly restricted."" The Wilson court
focused only on the former — a more restrictive analysis of burden.
The court's analysis in Crow, however, faltered in evaluating the plaintiffs' contention
that the alteration of the natural features constituted a first amendment violation."'" In
reaching its conclusion that no first amendment violation resulted from the state action,
the court relied on the fact that the plaintiffs had no property interest in Bear Butte or in
the park.'" Courts have consistently rejected the validity of this assertion relating to
claims to public lands.' More dispositive of the claim, however, is the court's analysis of
the evidence: construction did not constitute a burden because it was requested by the
plaintiffs and initiated to accommodate their religious practices.'" This evidence suggests
that the court's conclusion was proper arid reasonable. Employing an indispensability test,
the Crow court also properly found no infringement on religious practices because the
area traditionally used by plaintiffs for religious ceremonies was closed for overnight
camping.' Unlike the restrictions in Badoni, 377 the restrictions to right of access in Crow
were merely temporary and partial and no worshipper was ever denied access to the
site.'" The court properly based its finding of no burden on the plaintiff's failure to
a"' See supra notes 28-96 and accompanying text.
3" Id.
Crow, 706 F.2d at 858.
3
"9 See Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 790.
a" See id.
371
 591 F. Supp. at 790-91 (citing Life Science Church v. IRS, 525 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal.
(1981)).
372 See id. at 791.
373
374 See, e.g., Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164,
373 Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791. Defendant Gullet testified the platforms were erected to restrict
tourist traffic on the Butte and to provide greater privacy to worshippers. He also testified that
I ndian  religious campers had for the past 3 years urged the state to improve access and safety to the
ceremonial grounds. Id.
3" Id. at 792.
3" 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), eilj 'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
37" Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792.
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demonstrate the indispensability of overnight camping to their religion. 379 This fact alone
should have been dispositive of the claim; before analyzing the degree of infringement,
an infringement must be established. The court, however, proceeded to the next stage of
the balancing test by assessing the state interest. 38° Finding this interest compelling, the
court moved on to the final stage of the balancing test. 3" It then concluded that exclusion
of the public and religious users for a short time from the area was the least restrictive
means of completing the project.°
The Wilson and Crow courts both found a religious interest, but found that the
government did not burden that interest. Despite similar outcomes based on the same
conclusion, the courts diverged in their application and interpretation of the Sherbert and
Yoder tests. Given the facts of the case, the finding of the Crow court was reasonable. Had
the Wilson court, on the other hand, complied with the spirit of Sherbert and found a
burden, the religious interest of the Indians probably would have been found to outweigh
the state's interest in the private development of a small recreational facility.
4. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson: A Successful Claim
Unlike the claims in Bodoni, Sequoyah, Inupial, Wilson, and Crow, Native American
claims against the government in Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson
were successful. 383 In Peterson, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California held that interests asserted by Indians were protected under the free
exercise clause. 334 In Peterson, a group of Indian tribes challenged a forest service decision
to complete construction of a paved logging road through a unit of' national forest. 383 The
tribes argued that the road, which passed through the sacred high country of Chimney
Rock, brought disruptive intrusions of logging activity and traffic, thereby burdening
their religion in violation of the first amendment. 3" A district court judge denied the
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 3" The plaintiffs submitted numerous
affidavits attesting to the sanctity of the area and the centrality of the region to their
religious beliefs and practices. 338 Nevertheless, the court held that because the defendants
had allowed the plaintiffs reasonable access to the area they claimed was sacred, their






 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
3"4
 Id. at 591.
3" Id. at 590. Plaintiffs, seven non-profit organizations and unincorporated associations,
brought suit on a number of grounds in addition to the first amendment: AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1982); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370a (1982); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 - 1376 (1982); the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982);
the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982); the National Forest Management
Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600-1687 (1982); and general trust theories.
Plaintiffs challenged both the construction of the 6.02 mile road through the Chimney Rock
section of the forest which would connect two other sections of road as well as the forest management
plan providing for the harvesting of timber in the glue Creek Unit in which Chimney Rock lies.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 589-90.
3'6 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 592.
' 552 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
388 Id.
3811 id.
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that the use of public lands for religious purposes by a small section of the population
does not require the government to abdicate its statutory duty to manage lands for the
benefit of the public. 39°
The districi court later reversed its decision when it held that completion of the
logging road violated Native Americans' free exercise rights. 391 In reaching this decision,
the court recognized that the government had a greater duty in upholding the first .
amendment than previously acknowledged. The court began its analysis of the first
amendment claim by asserting that the unorthodox nature of a religion does not preclude
first amendment protection. 39' Recognizing that the northeastern corner of the Blue
Creek Unit was sacred to the Yurok, Karok and Tulowa tribes, and that the entire region
was sacred to thern, 393 the court noted that the tribes used the high country for religious
purposes and emphasized that the pristine environment of the high country had allowed
its continuous, regular use in this manner. 394 According to the court, construction of the
Chimney Rock section of the logging road would, as the plaintiffs asserted, impair
religious use of the area through increased recreational use, environmental degradation,
and aural and visual disturbances. 395 Additionally, the court recognized that the govern-
ment's proposed management plan, which entailed the construction of 200 miles of
logging road in contiguous areas to Chimney Rock despite proposed "protective zones"
around three sacred peaks, would have an equallyadverse impact on religious practice. 396
Because the defendants conceded that the Indians' use of the high country was
entitled to first amendment protection, the court evaluated whether the challenged
actions burdened the first amendment rights. 397 According to the court, both actions —
construction of the road and implementation of the management plan —would seriously
impair the plaintiffs' religious use of the high country,' This conclusion was based on the
court's finding that the high country was "the center of the spiritual world" for the tribes;
consequently, it was both central and indispensable to their religion. 399 The court recog-
nized the vital role of the religious practice in the preservation of the tribe and the
interaction of the religious and cultural life of' the tribe: "use of the high country in
training young persons in the tribes in traditional religious beliefs and ceremonies is
necessary to preserve such practices and to convey them to future generations.' Apply-
ing the reasoning of Yoder, the court determined that "degradation of the high country
3" Id.
" 1 565 F. Su pp. 589, 591 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The court denied preliminary injunctive relief based
on defendants' assurances that they would not construct the road until the court ruled on the merits
of the case at an early trial. Id.
'n Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Rd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
333 Id.
"4 Id. The court estimated that 110-119 members of the tribes make use of the high country. Id.
at 591 n.3.
39S Id. at 591-92. Individuals use the high country's prayer seats for spiritual exchanges with the
creator. Participants in tribal religious ceremonies must make trips to the high country to purify
themselves and to gather medicine. These acts enhance the spiritual well-being of the entire tribal
community. Id.
3" Id. at 592.
"7 Id.
3" Id. The plan called for clear-cutting which entails the logging of all the trees in a given area.
399 Id. at 594.
400 Id.
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and impairment of such training would carry a very real threat of undermining the tribal
communities and religious practices as they exist today.' >40]
Once the court had established that the plaintiffs' use of the high country was entitled
to first amendment protection and the government's action would burden that use, it
attempted to distinguish the facts of other cases involving Native American challenges to
government land use from the instant case. In Sequoyah, according to the court, the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the land to be flooded was central to their
religious practices.'" In Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, the District Court fOr the District of
Columbia had found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that development would im-
pinge on their practice, according to the Peterson court. 403 Similarly, the Peterson court
asserted, in Crow v. Gullet the plaintiffs failed to establish that government actions
burdened their religion. 404 According to the Peterson court, the Badoni decision addressed
the government interests of maintaining multi-state water and power generation projects
and found them compelling.'" Furthermore, the court continued, in Bodoni tourists
could not be prohibited from the area because of the strong government interest in
ensuring public access to a natural wonder and a statutory duty to do so. 4°8
The Peterson court therefore analyzed the infringement on religion by comparing the
facts of its case to those of other cases involving Native American land claims. Further-
more, the court drew on other free exercise cases to reach its conclusions. Although the
court in Wilson v. Block had found the reasoning of Sherbert and Pillar of Fire" inapposite,
the Peterson court found these two cases useful in determining whether the government
action created a burden on religion. 408
 In its broad reading of burden, the court also
relied on People v. Woody, 4w a case involving peyote use by Native Americans, to support
its conclusion:11 °
Having distinguished this case from prior cases, and having determined that the
construction of the logging road imposed a burden on the tribes' religion, the court
turned to the issue of the state's interest.'" The court scrutinized the five rationales
offered by the government for the construction of the Chimney Rock section of the road
and found that. none of the claimed government interests would he materially served by
the road and management plan. 412
 According to the court, access to the timber resources
would not be improved nor would the number of jobs in the area increase. 4 ' 3 Addition-
ally, the court found that recreational access was currently sufficient. and would not
increase dramatically, and that permitting motor vehicles in the area could contribute to
environmental degradation. 4 ' 4 The court determined that other interests asserted by the
401 Id. See also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.





4" See supra notes 350-63 and accompanying text.
40" Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595.
4"9 6I Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); see supra notes 115-121 and accom- •
partying text.
40 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595.
4 " Id. at 595-96.
1 " Id.
1 " Id. at 595-96. Timber could be harvested without the Chimney Rock Section. Id. at 595.
Positions would simply be transferred from one county to the next.
414 Id. at 596.
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government — fire protection, road maintenance, administrative services — did not
justify an infringement on the plaintiffs' first amendment right.s. 41 ' The court also found
that claims that the Forest Service reserves of timber would he increased as a result of the
construction were too speculative to warrant abridgement of free exercise rights."
According to the court, past. investment of resources in paved sections of the road was not
an interest sufficient to override the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.' Furthermore,
the court noted that the harvesting of timber pursuant to the management plan was not
compelling because, as a small fraction of the timber resources m the Six Rivers National
Forest, the timber would not increase timber supplies significantly.'" Finally, the court
noted that the management plan was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the
government's ends. As an alternative, the court suggested that the protective zones
around the religious sites be expanded. 4 t 9 The court therefore found that the decision of
the forest service violated the free exercise rights of the Northwest Indians.'
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson, the court found not only
an infringement on the plaintiffs' religion, but also that the government's action uncon-
stitutionally burdened the plaintiffs' religion."' Although the outcome of the case and the
application of the balancing test are proper, the court's reliance on the reasoning of the
courts in Sequoyah, Badoni, Wilson, and Crow is misplaced. Its analysis of these cases is
simplistic. For example, the Peterson court accepted the court's reasoning in Sequoyah that.
the claims failed because the government's action burdened cultural rather than religious
interests.'" The Peterson court also readily accepted the conclusion of the Hopi Indian Tribe
v. Block court that development of the peaks did not impinge on the plaintiffs' religion.'"
The court did not criticize the reasoning in any of the cases.
After establishing sincerity and centrality of the religious practice, the Peterson court
analyzed the burden. 424 In concluding that the logging road burdened the plaintiffs'
religion, the Peterson court carefully evaluated the evidence that the high country was
unique as the center of the spiritual world for the Northwest Indians."' Relying on the
Yoder case, the court analogized the burden created by imposing public education on the
Amish to the burden created by the degradation of the high country and the consequent
impairment. of religious training. 426 The court stated that both abridgements pose "a very
real threat of undermining the [tribal] communit[ies] and religious practice[s] as they
exist. today."" The Peterson court further analogized the burden created by deprivation
of peyote use as an integral part of Indian religious practices to the burden in the present
case. 426
 Using traditional first amendment "burden" cases in which a government action





4" Id. at 596-97.
" 1 Id. at 591.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 593.
4" Id. at 594.
425 Id. at 593.
428 Id.
"T Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218).
428 Id. at 595.
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denies a benefit or forces an action against religious beliefs, the Peterson court expanded
the notion of burden to include the destruction of irreplaceable religious sites. 4'9
The Peterson court recognized the sanctity of the entire region, rather than just
specific sites, just as the Wilson court had. 43° Unlike the Wilson court, however, the Peterson
court demonstrated great sensitivity to the plaintiffs' religion by recognizing the impact
on their religion which would result from the desecration of a small portion of the area."'
The court's analysis of the burden on religion is based on a broad reading of burden
derived from the Sherbert, Yoder, and Pillar of Fire decisions."' Unlike the Wilson court, the
court in Peterson did not invoke a different analysis of the free exercise claim simply
because the claim involved public lands; the court recognized that a lack of property
interest did not release the government from constitutional responsibilities imposed by
the first amendment. 433
The Wilson court set out a standard by which to evaluate the "burden" requirement of
claims involving public lands: the proposed land use would impair a religious practice
which could not be performed elsewhere." Without articulating the standard the Peterson
court seemed to apply it. 435 The standard, however, presents difficulty in application;
what degree of access must be precluded or how much alteration of natural features must
occur before a burden is found is unclear. In Wilson, a 777 acre portion of a 75,000 acre
sacred region was not shown to be central to the religion — therefore, the court con-
cluded that no burden on religion was demonstrated. Implicit in its conclusion is that the
religious practices could be performed in any area of the sacred region."'" In Peterson, on
the other hand, damage to the "visual, aural and environmental qualities of the high
country" resulting from the road and clear cutting was deemed to be a burden.'" Just as
public education threatened the religion of the Amish in Yoder, 43' the intrusions on the
high country threatened the Northwest Indians' religious beliefs and practices: 1n Accord-
ingly, the Peterson court afforded the Native Americans first amendment protection just as
the Amish had been afforded protection in Yoder.
Of those courts examining claims of Native Americans involving land, the Peterson
court alone found a burden on religion and applied the final part of the Sherbert and Yoder
tests — the balancing of interests. The Supreme Court has offered little in the way of
guidance to assess values of competing interests. It has, however, stipulated that "only
those interests of the highest order" can uphold a challenged government action once a
burden on free exercise is established."" Implicitly this statement affords religious free-
dom a high value. Under this directive, the Peterson court carefully examined the claimed
government interests and properly concluded that they did not justify infringement of
the plaintiffs' free exercise rights. In coming to this conclusion, the court properly applied
the final part of the balancing test: examining less restrictive alternatives.
429 Id.
43° Compare Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594, with Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742.
431 Id.
432
	 565 F. Supp. at 595.
433 Compare Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594, with Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744 & n.5.
434 See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744.
435 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594.
4" Wilson, 708 F.2d at 794.
4" Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595.
4" See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
43 ' Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594.
440 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
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The value placed on religion by the Peterson court is reflected in Supreme Court cases
involving the free exercise clause and, more specifically relevant to Native Americans, in
AIRFA. Both constitutional precedent and AIRFA support the conclusion that the
construction of a logging road which could be placed elsewhere and which would desec-
rate land sacred to a religious minority should not be permitted. The Peterson court's use
of traditional constitutional analysis in a non-traditional context of government action
and applied to a non-traditional religion is promising for future claims. Native Americans
can more easily overcome the obstacles to their claims of establishing a religious interest
and a burden on that interest if the Peterson decision is followed. The Peterson success was
contingent not only upon the proper use of constitutional precedents but a favorable set
of facts. The Native Americans were able to establish the radical impact this government
act would have on the religious use of the land, and the government project was not site
specific.
CONCLUSION
Because religion is inseparable from culture for Native Americans, the preservation
of religion is crucial to their functioning as a cultural and distinct minority. The first
amendment affords some degree of protection to religious practices and Native Amer-
icans have turned to the courts in their self-preservation and self-determination efforts.
This note has examined the way the state and federal courts have applied the Sherbert
and Yoder balancing tests to Native American claims which challenge government projects
interfering with access to sacred sites. Because of the unique character of their land-
• -elated religious practices, Native Americans have encountered stumbling blocks in at-
tempting to convince the courts that they have a religious interest in certain lands and that
government action imposes a burden on that interest. If Native Americans can establish
these elements, they must prove that their religious interests outweigh competing gov-
ernment interests. Given the large scale implications of government land mangement
projects, Native Americans may still encounter difficulties in passing the balancing test.
First amendment relief will be granted only if the value of Native American religion
and culture is recognized. Congress has taken steps towards this recognition with the
passage of AIRFA: "America does not need to violate the religions of her native peoples.
There is room for and great value in cultural and religious diversity. We would be poorer
if these American Indian religions disappeared from the face of the earth." 44 ' The courts
must now recognize and comply with this statement in evaluating Native American
religious claims.
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